File Name: capital structure and corporate governance .zip
Chen, Yinghong. This dissertation is divided into 4 essays. Each focuses on different aspect of firm risk and corporate governance issues. It mainly deals with corporate governance issues in the context of strong owner control and its implications to market efficiency.
Show all documents Any success firm needs an effective board that planning and drawing the major strategy for the firm and become as a guideline for all the forum members that finally maximize the shareholders return, many researchers found a negative relationship between board size and leverage Hamid, Mahdi , Abolfaz and Ali Reza,; Berger et al. Other researchers found a positive relationship between board size and leverage Wen et al. This discussion leads to the following hypothesis:. It estimates the impact of corporate governance attributes such as board size, outside directors, ownership concentration etc. It applies correlation analysis and panel data framework by taking into account both short term and long term debt equity ratio as dependent variable and different variables representing ownership structure , corporate governance and other control variables to study the relationship.
A superlative combination of the Board of Directors BOD with diverse members is considered a sign of a good governance structure. Meanwhile, the key decision taken by BOD to make organizations profitable is the capital structure with the optimal mix of debt and equity. Unfortunately, previous literature has reported this relationship with a mixed trend, which may be due to research gaps in the statistical analysis. Moreover, it also shows that the relationship between them has not yet been fully predicted and can still be completely understood. As we know that the OLS estimators are more sensitive to react adversely to this problem, yet we have not received enough evidence from similar researches that cares about it. Consistent with these arguments, this study focuses primarily on exploring the influence of corporate governance structure and the capital structure on firms' market-oriented and accounting-based performance, especially with the contemplation of outliers. Hypotheses have been evaluated using M-estimators and S-estimators of robust regression for 45 listed firms for the period from to
This paper examines the cross-sectional relation between ownership structure and corporate performance of a sample of manufacturing firms listed on the Chinese stock exchange. Following the agency theory and taking other influential factors into account, such as firm size, leverage ratio, variance of sales, growth of sale and firm age, the results suggest that there is a strong relation between ownership concentration and corporate performance, measured by Tobin's Q. A further classification of owners reveals that while shares held by state play a negative role in corporate governance, domestic institutional and managerial shareholdings improve the firms' performance. This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution. Rent this article via DeepDyve.
Capital structure determination is considered as one of the key corporate financing decisions and managers often face difficulty in finding the optimal one. There are various theories regarding this phenomenon in the finance literature and this issue has been discussed since long. No theory can be regarded as the conclusive one as varying evidences found regarding this complex issue. Presently, the need to determine an optimal capital structure has become more troublesome as well as important due to the emergence of a need of the best corporate governance practices. To mitigate agency problem, the organizations may implement code of corporate governance. This study aims to investigate about the impact of corporate governance on capital structure determination.
A very well-known theory of capital structure is pecking-order theory which leads to the agency theory. According to agency theory, conflicts between management and owners of the company arise agency problems. These agency problems then create conflicts between the interests of managers and those of shareholders.
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